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The case of Jim 
 
Jim was arrested arriving at the house of an unattended minor, having brought with him some alcoholic 
drinks, condoms, and an overnight bag. Records of online conversations Jim was having with the minor 
give the court strong evidence that the purpose of this meet-up was to engage in sexual relations with the 
minor. In the course of searching his home computer, investigators also found child pornography. Jim was 
charged with intent to sexually abuse a child and possession of child pornography. He was given due 
process, and convicted, by a jury of his peers, on both counts. This is not the first time that Jim has been 
convicted of a sexual offence. He had been found guilty of possession of child pornography in the past, 
and served time for it.  
 
What should we do with Jim? The obvious answer is that we should send him to prison. In such cases, 
most people think that some form of imprisonment is justified, though there would be disagreement on 
why it is justified: to deprive him of access to potential victims, to deter others from committing similar 
crimes, or just to ensure that he experiences the suffering that he deserves.  
 
But at some point, Jim will need to be released. Most accept that there is an upper limit on how long a 
person can be imprisoned. At some point, the punishment will become disproportionate -- too severe for 
the crime committed. Yet we may be concerned with the possibility of Jim’s reoffending once he is 
released. A stint in prison can do much to change a person, but it will not always be successful at 
preventing reoffending -- indeed, it may even have the opposite effect;1 and remember that Jim has been 
here before. We might, then, think that the criminal justice system should also do something to reform 
or rehabilitate him.2  
 
Suppose that Jim feels remorseful, and he felt remorse after the first time as well. Getting caught the 
second time has made it very clear to him that, for him, remorse isn’t enough. If he is going to change, he 
needs more than remorse; he needs help. Should we offer him help? It is very plausible that the answer 
is yes. Jim did something bad, and he wants to change, but doesn’t know how. If we have means available 
to us to help him with this, it would seem difficult to justify withholding them from him. Even if one is not 
concerned with helping Jim to be the person he wants to be, one is likely still going to be concerned with 
whether he commits further crimes, if and when he is released. 
 
 
1 See Lynne Vieiratis, Tomislav Kovandzic and Thomas Marvell, ‘The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: 
Evidence from State Panel Data, 1974-2002’, in Criminology and Public Policy 6/3 (2007), 589-622. 
2 Other possible measures would include, for instance, limiting Jim’s movement once he is released such that he cannot 
come within a certain range of a school, or requiring that he report to his neighbors as a sexual offender. 
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So how do we go about helping Jim change? There are a variety of things we might try to do. Suppose we 
were to offer Jim a device that could detect when he is about to get some of his problematic urges and 
release a drug meant to neutralize them. Some would find these sorts of methods strange, and perhaps 
intuitively problematic. Using technology to solve social problems, like crime, tends to give us pause. But 
in the following, we will argue that using technology to prevent crime isn’t necessarily problematic; insofar 
as we are comfortable using more conventional means for rehabilitating Jim, we should be comfortable 
with using some technological methods as well. 
 
What we might do with Jim 
 
So what might we do with Jim? Perhaps we could offer him an educational program, involving a series of 
courses that Jim can participate in while incarcerated. Suppose that these courses are designed to help 
him think through the consequences of his actions, to reflect on the type of person he wants to be, and 
to improve his thinking skills more generally. Suppose that during his first term in prison, Jim took these 
courses. They did help him a bit, but obviously not enough to prevent him from reoffending once released. 
When asked why the educational programs didn’t help much, Jim says he doesn’t know, but he has some 
ideas. He often found it difficult to focus during the courses, and because of this, he may not have taken 
the information on board, or retained it, as much as he may have liked.  
 
Now suppose that we have an inexpensive pharmaceutical, say Adderall, which helps to solve this problem 
by helping him to concentrate on the courses. Were we to offer the drug to Jim to take in conjunction 
with the educational program, he might do better this time around. Should we offer it to him? Some might 
think that he shouldn’t get it without a prescription from a doctor, a doctor who has assessed him as 
having a clinical condition for which Adderall is an approved treatment—say, Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Suppose he doesn’t have one of these conditions, but we still think that 
the Adderall could help. Why not offer it to him, if it could help him get more from the courses?  
 
When people object to the use of Adderall by those who do not have a prescription or a diagnosed 
condition for which it is a licensed treatment, they are normally thinking about cases very different from 
that of Jim. For instance, one concern is that the use of Adderall without a prescription is illegal. But this 
would clearly not be a problem here, since we are discussing what the state should do, and the state could 
simply make it legal for Jim to take Adderall. Some argue that the use of drugs like Adderall to improve, 
say, a college student’s performance, is problematic because one of the goals of the educational system 
is to evaluate students on their merits, and the use of so-called ‘smart drugs’ interferes with this. This 
might make it difficult for future potential employers to make reliable assessments of job candidates. Also, 
it may simply be unfair that some students get an advantage over others not through hard work or ability, 
but through using a drug. And we might worry that the achievements students make while using Adderall 
are not as worthy as those of others who achieved the same without the use of enhancers.3 
 
 
3 For an overview of this debate, see Alberto Giubilini and Sagar Sanyal, ‘The Ethics of Human Enhancement’, 
Philosophy Compass 10/4 (2015), 233-43. 
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We don’t wish to get into that debate here; however, it is important to note that, in the context of 
rehabilitating individuals, merit does not have the significance that it does in the general education 
system. Here, we’re not primarily concerned with Jim getting the evaluation that he merits, with whether 
he is getting an unfair advantage over others in the education programme, with whether his achievement, 
if he manages to refrain from further offending, is worthy, nor with whether his performance on the 
programme will be a good marker for future employers. Our main goals are to prevent Jim from 
reoffending and, perhaps, to help him become a better person. If giving him Adderall can help with this, 
then it’s not clear why we shouldn’t offer it; the typical arguments against the use of Adderall without a 
medical need won’t apply here. 
 
Would this be enough - an educational program and a smart drug like Adderall? Sure, Jim might get better 
at recognizing the consequences of his actions, including the long-term effects his behavior might have 
on his victims, for instance. But another big problem is his motivational states; his urges and desires are a 
significant driver of his behavior, and seem to be a big part of the problem. Even if he knows what the 
consequences of his actions are, he may just not care enough about those consequences to overcome 
some of his urges. Or perhaps he cares enough most of the time, but sometimes has lapses. Maybe, then, 
we could offer him help in changing or better controlling his motivational states, such as his paedophilic 
urges and his concern for the consequences of his actions. 
 
Suppose then that the educational program, intended to improve his general thinking skills, is 
supplemented with therapy, intended to help him with his motivations, including his paedophilic urges. 
Some forms of therapy aim to improve patients’ control over their thoughts and feelings; for instance, by 
helping patients to recognize and block a thought process before it causes problems. Perhaps using these 
tools, Jim could learn to recognize the urges and desires that may often lead him to unwanted behavior, 
and nip them in the bud. This would give Jim more control over his own mind by helping him to prevent 
situations where the urges continue to strengthen and dominate his thinking.  
 
Consider, for example, one self-control strategy that we sometimes use when we recognize that our 
thoughts, feelings, or urges may be getting away from us, or when we feel overwhelmed: we close our 
eyes, take a few deep breaths, and perhaps count to ten. Doing so can help us to calm down, refocus on 
the bigger picture, or simply interrupt a vicious circle. There is presumably a complicated story as to how 
this works, and here we offer some speculations. Studies suggest that there is a limit to the amount of 
attention we can sustain at any given time; forcing ourselves to perform a task that requires a large 
amount of this attention means that there is much less attention to devote to other things. By taking deep 
breaths, we may be taking attention away from the strengthening desire, and the process that leads to its 
strengthening. Perhaps, instead, the change in oxygen levels is doing some significant work. Or, such a 
strategy might enable us to take a third-person perspective on some of our mental states, allowing us to 
have more control over them, in the moment. The complete story is not all that relevant for our purposes, 
and nor is it important whether Jim is aware of the full story. Many of our strategies for resisting desires 
are of this sort. They do not involve a careful reasoning process; rather, they involve our triggering some 
process, the inner workings of which we are unaware, that gets us the result we want. 
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So suppose we offer Jim a form of therapy that includes teaching and encouraging him to employ self-
control strategies like the deep-breaths technique. This might give Jim better chances of reforming. But 
there’s no guarantee it will work. There are many people like Jim out there, many of them receive therapy, 
and many of them still reoffend after being released from prison. We will just consider two reasons why 
such strategies might fail. 
 
One reason is that people like Jim might not recognize the urge until it is too late for the strategy to have 
a significant effect, or may not recognize the urge at all.   Now suppose that scientists’ understanding of 
how the brain works has continued to progress to the point that they can monitor the brain and reliably 
detect the onset of such urges. Making use of this technology, they have created a device that Jim can 
wear, a device which warns him that the urges are about to arise. While Jim is wearing this device, it can 
detect precursors of his urges, and give him a warning; say, by making his watch vibrate. Using this device, 
Jim can avoid the risk of failing to recognize or react to the urge in time, since the device gives him a clear 
signal that he is probably about to get one. 
 
Offering this device to Jim, we think, would be permissible. We can suppose that the device does not share 
information with anyone, and that the vibration on the watch is noticeable only by Jim. This sort of device 
would simply be an aid in improving the efficacy of the strategies he learns through the therapy; it would 
make Jim more effective at controlling his own urges. 
 
The second reason why strategies like the deep breaths technique might fail is that, even if Jim recognizes 
the urge in time, and implements the strategy, the strategy may not be effective. Perhaps the urge this 
time around is too strong for the technique to significantly alleviate it. Or perhaps parts of the 
environment that triggered the onset of the urge persist, and maybe get more intense, thereby 
overwhelming the strategy. So suppose that there’s more to the device; suppose that not only does it give 
Jim a signal when it detects a precursor of the urge, it also has a button that Jim can press. When Jim 
presses this button, the device releases a drug that is reliably effective at neutralizing these urges.4 Thus, 
when his watch vibrates, Jim can choose to press the button and give himself a small injection of the drug. 
Alternatively, Jim can set the device to ‘automatic’ mode. In this mode, it releases the drug whenever it 
detects precursors to the urges, with no input required from Jim. We can further suppose that the drug is 
safe, and does not have significant side-effects. 
 
Offering this amplified device to Jim, we think, would be permissible as well. Obviously, there is an 
important difference between these devices; the first device lets Jim know when the urge is likely to arise, 
allowing him to implement his preferred technique. The second device lets him use a drug in combination 
with, or in place of, this technique. But, we will argue, it’s doubtful that this difference is in itself morally 
significant.  
 
Let’s begin by focusing on the similarities between the two devices. Both devices only ‘kick in’ when the 
problematic urge is about to arise. The goal of both devices is to prevent the urge from getting stronger, 
 
4 If it helps, one can think of this device as using a similar mechanism as an insulin pump, intended for use by diabetics. 
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or leading to problematic behavior. You might think that there’s an important difference in the way in 
which the devices achieve their goals. The drug, you might think, is problematic because it doesn’t work 
by getting Jim to appreciate his reasons not to engage in inappropriate or illegal sexual behavior. However, 
it is not clear that self-control strategies like the deep-breaths technique do so either; we might just use 
such a strategy because of its results. 
 
You might instead object to the drug-device in ways that some object to so-called ‘motivation enhancers’. 
Motivational enhancers are intended to change a person’s motivations for the better; for instance, by 
helping a person to achieve her goals, including the goal of being a better person. Many of the objections 
to them look quite a bit like the arguments against the use of smart drugs that we considered above. 
Consider motivational enhancements that increased students’ motivation to study, or athletes’ 
motivation to further develop their skills. One might worry that the use of such enhancements would 
devalue the achievements of these students or athletes, or that their use would be unfair to other 
students or athletes. But when we’re considering rehabilitating Jim, he isn’t in a competition with anyone, 
and we’re not concerned with whether he deserves some accolade, or whether his achievements have 
merit. In the context of prisoner rehabilitation, it’s reform that we want, so these arguments don’t hold 
sway. 
 
Alternatively, you might be concerned that Jim could come to rely on the device, and thus become worse 
at controlling his urges on his own. We have two points to make in response. First, in terms of avoiding 
recidivism, this would not be a problem if Jim has the option of using the device indefinitely. Relying on 
the device would only be problematic if the device might be taken away. Second, we wouldn’t think this 
was a particularly powerful objection if Jim had an alternative strategy. Suppose, for instance, that instead 
of using a device, Jim develops a friendship, or a relationship with a counselor or priest, such that he can 
count on this person to help talk him down whenever his urges start to become strong. Few, would think 
that this is a problematic way of preventing recidivism. And few would think that he should avoid forming 
the relationship because he might come to rely on the other person too much. 
 
Another concern you might have is that the drug-device, when set on automatic, somehow leaves Jim’s 
agency out of the process; and this is somehow a problem. When the device is on the automatic setting, 
Jim doesn’t do anything; it is just the device detecting precursors of the urges and neutralizing them with 
the drug. We concede that, at the time at which the device neutralizes the urges, Jim is passive with regard 
to the process. However, we do not think that this means that Jim, as an agent, is no longer involved. In 
order for the device to be on the automatic setting, he needs to have changed the setting earlier. Compare 
this to some other strategies agents might use. Suppose that Jack, in order to prevent himself from driving 
drunk later, gives his keys to his friend, who agrees not to give Jack the keys if he is drunk. Or suppose 
that Jill is often late to lunch with her friends because she is sometimes distracted by the new devices at 
the electronic store on her way to the restaurant. She might decide, as she is leaving her house, to take a 
slightly different route which avoids the electronics store, thereby avoiding the temptation. Jack and Jill 
both do things to ensure that they don’t have, or don’t act on, certain urges or motivations later on, when 
they know that it will be harder to resist them. Jim’s setting the device on automatic, we suggest, is similar. 
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It is a case where he acts now to avoid certain actions later. Thus, we reject the view that the device, when 




Starting with a type of education programme that we think few would find problematic, we have 
progressed step-by-step through a range of interventions that might be offered to Jim. In each case, we 
have tried to show that it is hard to see why the intervention should not be offered, at least, if we accept 
the previously mentioned interventions. This pushes us towards a view according to which, if we accept 
the education programme, then we ought to accept all of the other interventions that we have discussed 
as well (as and when they become safe and technologically feasible). This would mean accepting a greatly 
expanded role for technology in our criminal justice systems, compared to what we see at present.5  
 
Some might wish to resist this conclusion. How might they do so?  One strategy would be to appeal solely 
to intuition. For example, someone could hold that, intuitively, the drug-based intervention with which 
we ended our discussion is so much more problematic than the educational intervention with which we 
began that we simply must accept that there is an ethical difference between them, even if we cannot say 
what the rational basis for this difference is. We find this strategy unappealing. After all, many people 
previously had the intuitions that slavery was unproblematic and some people now have the intuitions 
that mix-race couples are objectionable or that women ought not to be allowed to work outside the home. 
Few of us would be willing to take these intuitions, without a rational basis, as indicative of what is actually 
morally acceptable or unacceptable--most of us would hold that, since they cannot be given any rational 
basis, these intuitions are mere prejudices. Perhaps our intuitions against the greater use of technology 
in criminal justice are mere prejudices too.  
 
A second strategy would be to identify some morally significant difference between some of the 
interventions that we have proposed and others--some difference that we have overlooked. This strategy 
is more promising. Still, we find it hard to see what the neglected difference might be. So let us end by 
posing the reader with a challenge: either offer a good argument for drawing a line somewhere along the 
spectrum of interventions that we have discussed, or accept that there is, potentially at least, an expansive 
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5 We have not, in this chapter, considered the possibility that technological interventions might be used to help 
criminals’ rehabilitation without their consent. For a discussion of this possibility, see Jonathan Pugh and Thomas 
Douglas, ‘Neuro-Interventions as Criminal Rehabilitation: An Ethical Review’ in J. D. Jacobs and J. Jackson (eds.) 
The Routledge Handbook of Criminal Justice Ethics (Routledge, 2017). 
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